Each year, we deliver a number of free Open Days during which we introduce and demonstrate our high quality and innovative security training products and services.

The Open Days provide a great opportunity for you to discover how our products work and how they can be implemented into your security training operation to improve the confidence, knowledge and skills of your employees.

Our Open Days also provide a free buffet lunch and refreshments throughout the day; a perfect chance for you to network with fellow security professionals.

Upcoming Open Days

Hungary – Budapest

• Monday, 12th of September 2011

Contact Rita (rm@renful.co.uk) to register for this Open Day

Netherlands – Amsterdam

• Thursday, 22^nd September 2011

Contact Monica (ma@renful.co.uk) to register for this Open Day

Italy – Rome

• Thursday, 29^th September, 2011

Contact Natasha (nm@renful.co.uk) to register for this Open Day

Switzerland – Zurich

• To be announced

Contact Dana (da@renful.co.uk) to declare your interest in attending this open day

France – Lyon

• To be announced (November)

Contact Natasha (nm@renful.co.uk) to register for this Open Day

Additional Info

Renful Premier Technologies is a market leader in security training and consultancy, currently operating in over 40 countries throughout the world. The company was founded in 1994 by security professionals with the aim of improving the level of training and testing provided to security personnel throughout the world.

An Integrative Approach to Security Training, Testing & Management

We believe in a multi level approach to security training that takes into account every aspect of a security screener’s job cycle from selection, through initial training, certification, refresher training and professional development.

Our Integrative Approach to Security X-Ray Training, Testing & Management is designed to provide our customers with the tools required to hire the best possible candidates for the role of x-ray screener and in addition provide them with the knowledge, skills and experience needed to identify the threats they are likely to encounter.

Although each product can be purchased individually, we have grouped them together in our diagram above to show you at which point in the screener’s job cycle they are used, what they are, why they are needed and how they work.

Click on a product for more information

• Pre-M – Pre-employment testing
• Trefox – Training Essentials for X-Ray
• Avsec School – Security E-Learning Portal
• Simfox – Security X-ray Training & Testing
• Infogence – Terrorism Intelligence Report
• Simulants – Inert Explosives & Drugs
• Middlesex University – Accredited Security Courses

OpeReady is a unique Operational Readiness Management System that can be used to monitor and control in real-time the operational readiness level of departments and individual employees within security operations.

An Improvement on the current system

For Security Managers it is difficult to stay on top of all the different recurrent training and qualification requirements of their employees.

For example, Airport Security Managers must manage the training requirements of a vast amount of employees with different job descriptions and therefore different training requirements. They employ x-ray screeners that must go through X-ray induction courses, GSAT, airport evacuation courses, on the job training and recurrent x-ray simulation training. On the other hand, Armed Guards have completely different training requirements including Weapons Training, Weapon License renewals, etc…

The Security Manager must therefore check through endless records stored on computerised excel sheets and/or paperwork every day to get an understanding of whom needs training and when. This system makes it far too easy for Security Managers to miss their employees’ training requirements and puts at risk the readiness of their Security Operation.

OpeReady provides a much simpler and less time consuming way of managing the readiness of employees. It is designed to manage the qualification, training, re-training and results of the whole workforce and provides the security manager with various automated reports indicating the readiness of single employees, a group of employees, divisions, departments, etc…

The system can be utilised by large or small organisations or installed in governing bodies such as the CAA or Department for Transport to identify and manage training and qualification requirements and records of thousands of employees with different jobs throughout the country.

Monitor Individual Employee Readiness

Each employee recorded onto the OpeReady system has their own specific job description, personal details and qualification route and is assigned the type and level of training and qualifications they must achieve periodically.

Each time the employee has carried out a training activity, an operational drill, a supervisor evaluation or achieved a qualification, their results can be quickly placed onto their Personal Employment Record.

The Personal Employment Record stores these results as well as real time events and data from external sources such as the Simfox x-ray simulator and CBTs. These records can be viewed as a list or via a Graphical Performance Analysis Module which maps out their results over a specified period of time.

Every 24 hours OpeReady scans the personal employment record of each employee, compares their results against the requirements of their job description, and ranks their readiness level according to three grades:

“Satisfactory”(green) means that the employee meets all the predetermined professional requirements.

Imagine the following scenario…

A passenger and their child are waiting in line to get their bag screened at the Airport. Their bag is placed into the x-ray machine and shown on a screen ready for analysis by the screener on duty. As the screener sees something that may look suspicious, he stops the bag and analyses its x-ray image for approximately 2 minutes.  The screener calls over one of his colleagues, and then their supervisor and together they all examine the x-ray image further. Finally, they take the bag to the nearest counter, open it, and after a quick search, pull out a toy replica of a 9mm handgun.

So far so good, the security team have fulfilled their job and successfully detected a replica of a weapon.

Scenario 2

Imagine now a seemingly similar, yet completely different scenario…

Although we are still dealing with a passenger and their child, this time the passenger is not a parent who has made the innocent mistake of packing his child’s favorite toy but a dangerous psychopath.  As in the previous scenario, the security team gathers in front of the x-ray machine’s screen and analyses the suspicious bag’s image. After a few minutes, they take the bag to the nearest counter to carry out the search procedure in front of the passenger.

As the screener pulls the gun from the bag, the passenger, realising that he is about to be exposed, grabs the gun and opens fire.

Why did they act in such hesitancy – gathering, consulting and delaying the search procedure?

This familiar phenomenon has a number of possible explanations which are typical to the security world of airports and elsewhere:

1. The employees are concerned that they will create a false alarm and be held responsible for causing delays and disturbing the airport routine as they know that although they formally acted correctly, they will receive an informal warning for creating an unnecessary disturbance.
2. The employees have never experienced a real event in the past and do not believe the threat is “for real”. In their minds the worst case scenario is that they find a toy gun.
3. The existing procedure for actions in case of a suspicious weapon is not detailed or clear enough, especially in “border line” cases.
4. The employees do not have the skills required to correctly interpret x-ray images and operate x-ray machines. For example, they cannot identify the differences between real and toy handguns.
5. The employees act using an informal procedure developed in the “field” as a result of missing parts in the formal one.
6. There is a lack of coordination between the security personnel at check points and the police personnel in Airports. As both bodies are located in different areas and are subjected to different authorities, they tend to act independently.
7. Due to the high percentage of turnover among security personnel, many of the employees are novices and will, when faced by a dilemma, follow a natural tendency and consult with their seniors before making a decision.

BEMOSA Research

A field research conducted in a number of European airports by BEMOSA (Behaviour Modeling for Security in Airports, lead and co-ordinated by Prof. A. Kirschenbaum) see: Jane’s Airport Review (May 2011) and http://bemosa.technion.ac.il , examined the reactions and performance of screeners in situations similar to the scenarios outlined in this article.

After preliminary analysis of the data, the researchers indicated that the employees were hesitant and, rather than following written procedures, tended to consult with colleagues before making a decision. One of the main reasons found for this was a lack of confidence, procedural knowledge and skills in detection due to a lack of training.

What can be done in order to change the employees’ attitudes towards the procedures and ensure they act upon them, make decisions based on knowledge and professional skill within a reasonable time?

The possible explanations for hesitancy listed above show that the problem is an outcome of the organisational structure, the diffusion of responsibilities, the operational pressure, many “grey areas” in the procedures and, as the ‘BEMOSA’ researchers also indicated, deficiency in professional skills through a lack of training.

Although it is essential to pay attention to all these aspects, I would like to focus on training and what is possible and should be expected from it.  First of all, it should be clarified that the training aspect must deal with several objectives simultaneously, each requiring its own tools and instruction techniques in order to achieve effective results.

The following are examples of the basic elements required to create a training program for security personnel:

Objective: Improving screening machine operation skill and detecting problematic objects and weapons.

1. Using a training and testing x-ray simulator

In order to achieve results it is necessary to create training sets that get progressively harder as screeners improve their detection skills. The difficulty of the training should be based on the type of threat required for detection, its angle, how it is concealed, other distracting elements within the bag and the required speed of detection.

Frequency of training sets should be fixed. The more the employee will experience the simulator, the more he will improve his detection skills, confidence and decision making skills.

1. Personal remedial instruction

Continuous analysis of each employee’s performance on the training simulator should be carried out to identify their weaknesses and rectify them. For example, if an employee’s detection rate for I.E.D. is lower than average, they should be given personal and customised training that deals specifically with I.E.D.

Objective: Improving the implementation of procedures

1. Performance skill inspection- (usually once a year)

Visual observation should be carried out to evaluate each employee’s general actions and assess their level of performance when operating screening machines, making decisions, dealing with passengers and communicating with colleagues. At the end of the inspection they should get feedback on their performance.

Objective: Maintaining alertness and checking performance level in real time.

1. Drills

Employees must pass an unexpected drill in order to ensure that their performance on the job is similar to their performance on the simulator and during their performance skill inspection.

Drills work by reinforcing alertness and serve as a means for drawing conclusions. Unlike the simulator, which only examines the detection skills and decision making required for the first phase, the drill enables supervisors to examine the whole process including the search procedure.

Objective: Developing attitudes

1. Seminars

Seminars should be organised in order to emphasise to employees the importance of quick and reliable reports, personal responsibility to high alertness, determination not to give up in cases of doubts and dilemmas and the importance of passenger service. In these seminars, all employees should be given role-playing exercises and experience simulations of events in which they are required to use their problem solving skills and make critical decisions.

1. CBT

It is also possible to create simulations and trainings by computer (CBT) although it is less effective due to a lack of the interaction required for effectively assimilating attitudes.

1. Drills & Performance skill inspections

Expected attitudes are also developed from personal interaction and feedback from drills and performance skill inspections.

Objective: Shortening proficiency training and qualification period

1. On the job training and qualification process.

After basic training, employees require personal tutoring.  This should be carried out by a senior employee who has gone through training to become a personal tutor.

1. Using the simulator as a part of the tutoring process and as a skill enhancement after qualification.

Supplemental training for new employees, shortly after qualification, that focuses on problem solving.

Maintaining a successful training program & monitoring employee performance

For a training program to be successfully maintained it is important that instructors are able to monitor their employees’ performance, identify weaknesses and implement strategies to rectify them.

Monitoring systems, such as OpeReady, provide instant feedback to instructors as to whether their employees have completed the training components assigned to them and achieved the performance level required. Instructors are then able to push any low performers to priority and provide remedial training immediately.

Conclusion

It is clear that implementing such a training procedure would entail significant costs. However, the investment would be paid back by significant reductions in false alarms, the improvements in security, faster passenger flow and improved customer satisfaction.

While a training program will significantly improve many aspects of the security process, it must be emphasised that, if provided on its own, it will not achieve all the organisational objectives. “Grey parts” within the procedures must be clarified, organisational structure must be examined and made more effective and coordination between the different authorities in charge of security must be improved.

On the 11^th December, 2010, a car explosion and a suicide bomb attack injured two people, killed the bomber, and caused panic among Christmas shoppers in Stockholm, Sweden. Minutes before an email had been sent to news agency TT warning about the impending blasts, though it did not provide details of where the explosions would actually take place.

The Incidents

The first bombing occurred at 16:48 CET when an Audi 80 Avant car exploded at the intersection of Olof Palmes gata and Drottninggatan.

According to Rescue services spokesman Roger Sverndal, the car contained bottles of liquefied petroleum gas canisters. The car was also filled with a box of very sharp spikes designed to fly in all directions at the moment of the explosion. Two people were taken to hospital with minor injuries.

Amateur videos shot moments after the explosion show the car engulfed by flames although there appears to have been little damage caused to surrounding vehicles and shops. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XSdU1U0AqE&feature=player_embedded

The second explosion occurred at around 17:00 CET at the intersection of Bryggargatan and Drottninggatan, around 200 metres (650 feet) away from the first bombing.

Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, thought to be the suicide bomber, was found dead at the site with blast injuries to his abdomen. Close to him, a metal pipe and a rucksack filled with nails and an unknown substance suspected to be an explosive were found. According to reports, he shouted Arabic slogans before setting off the explosion.

An eyewitness interviewed by the Dagens Nyheter newspaper said something appeared to have blown up against the man’s abdomen.

“He had no injuries to his face or the rest of his body and the shops around him were not damaged,” he said.

The eyewitness, a paramedic identified only as Pascal, said he removed a “Palestinian scarf” from the man’s face in an attempt to free up his airways.  Another eyewitness said of the blast; “It shook the store that I was in, and then there was smoke and gunpowder coming into the store.”

The Warning

Minutes before the explosions, the Swedish news agency TT had received a message denouncing Sweden’s military presence in Afghanistan and threatening deadly attacks.

The statement, taking the form of audio recordings in Swedish and Arabic, criticised Sweden for having 500 troops in Afghanistan, and said that the Swedes’ “children, daughters and sisters will die like our brothers and sisters and children are dying”. It also made reference to a Swedish cartoonist, Lars Viiks, who depicted the Prophet Muhammed as having the body of a dog.

The Suicide Bomber

The suicide bomber is Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, a 28-year-old Iraqi Swede, born in Baghdad, who grew up in Tranas and who was naturalized as a Swedish citizen in 1992.

After graduating from secondary school in Sweden in 2001, he studied at the University of Bedfordshire in the UK, graduating with a degree in sports therapy in 2004. The same year he married a Swedish citizen, named Mona Thwany or “Umm Amira”, with whom he had two daughters and a son. He named his son Osama in honour of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. At the time of the bombings, he was living in Luton with his wife, who also holds fundamentalist Islamic views. He travelled back to Sweden on 19 November to visit his relatives in Tranas.

Reports indicate he had steadily become more religious as well as angry over the later 2000s. During Ramadan in 2007, he tried to recruit other Muslims who shared his political views at the Luton mosque when he was given a chance to preach. However, when confronted over his beliefs he stormed out of the mosque and was eventually banned from coming back.

The IED

According to various news sources the man had pipe bombs strapped to his body and a rucksack filled with explosives. Investigators believe the fact that his rucksack bomb was not used at all, and his failure to detonate his suicide belt in a crowded area, suggests that one of the pipe bombs strapped to his body exploded prematurely killing him before he could reach his intended target.

Pipe Bombs are Improvised Explosive Devices tightly sealed within metal pipes. The containment provided by the pipe means that simple low explosives can be used to produce a relatively large explosion while the fragmentation of the pipe itself creates potentially lethal shrapnel.

The bomb is usually a short section of steel water pipe containing the explosive mixture and closed at both ends with steel or brass caps. In this case eyewitness reports of smoke and gunpowder after the blast suggests that the terrorist used a black powder explosive, which could have been taken from Fireworks. It is likely that the explosive would have been ground fine to accelerate its burning rate.

A fuse is inserted into the pipe with a lead running out through a hole in the side or capped end of the pipe. The fuse can be electric with wires leading to a timer and battery or can be a common fuse used in most consumer fireworks.

The pressure of the explosive material when ignited would have built up very rapidly, rupturing the pipe with great force.

Growing Tensions

The incident comes amid increased scrutiny of social tensions within Swedish society after decades of heavy immigration from Muslim countries. In September, the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats party secured its first seats in parliament after winning nearly 6 per cent of the vote.

The Stockholm explosions represent the latest in a series of failed terrorist attacks by jihad groups aimed at western countries, including a foiled Yemeni plot to bomb US freight aircraft in October and a botched car bomb attack in New York’s Times Square in May.

The IEDs shown are concealed within “hollowed out” books. The explosive has shown up as green under x-ray, suggesting a Gunpowder explosive such as black powder or other variant which could have been taken from Fireworks. The detonator appears to be a light bulb filament (glass cap cut-off) possibly from a strong 12V light bulb. The power supply is provided by eight 1.5V batteries which under x-ray appear as small dark blue cylinders. The larger blue metallic cylinder is thought to be a can of aerosol which would have added flame and pressure to the charge and even provided shrapnel.

Both IEDs appear to have simple booby trap mechanisms consisting of a clothes peg connected to the cover of the book and to the electrical circuit. While the book is closed, the peg holds a non-conducting material which stops any electricity flowing from the power supply to the detonator.  Once the book is opened, the non conductive material is removed, the circuit is closed and the electric current causes the light bulb filament to heat up which, in turn, would burn or detonate the explosives.

There is a good chance that this explosive would not have achieved detonation, mainly because it is a slow-burning explosive which needs to be packed in a closed container to achieve detonation. Having said that, it could have caused serious burn injuries to the person who would have opened the “book”.

The terrorists have been declared “Amateurs” by Greek authorities, and indeed there is no attempt to conceal the IEDs in any way. However, the IEDs were fully functional, and were apparently capable of causing death or serious injury.  There is even the possibility that they could have accidently triggered mid-flight causing damage to an aircraft. According to Greek investigators, the two IEDs were destined for the International police organisation Europol in the Netherlands and the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg.

Co-ordinated Campaign of Terror

These explosive devices are thought to be connected to the string of mail bombs sent to several embassies in Athens and foreign leaders including German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the beginning of November. All the explosive devices sent out are thought to retain similar characteristics including concealment within books and the use of gunpowder.

Although no-one was seriously harmed in any of the attacks, two of the parcel bombs did detonate at their intended destination.  One parcel, left outside the Swiss embassy, burst into flames when its external packaging was removed while another exploded shortly afterwards at the Russian embassy. Another parcel, addressed to the Chilean embassy, exploded in the offices of a private courier company.

One IED successfully managed to breach Air Mail security checks, making it all the way to the German chancellery’s mail room. Fortunately, the containing package was detected by mail room staff as having marks that indicated the possibility of explosives and was deactivated by security forces. Mrs. Merkel’s spokesman, Steffen Seibert, said “the package contained sufficient explosive to have caused harm to people”.

Another package, addressed to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was detected at the Bologna airport in northern Italy and caught fire when it was searched. Nobody was hurt, but the airport was temporarily closed down and several flights got re-routed to other Italian airports.

The Suspects

Two young Greeks, Panayotis Argyrou, 22, a chemistry student, and Gerassimos Tskalos, 24, have been arrested in connection with the wave of attacks after being found in possession of a package addressed to President Sarkozy and another destined for the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

They are believed to be linked to the radical group “Conspiracy of Cells of Fire,” which has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against government buildings and banks. The group is thought to be linked to the urban guerrillas who have killed police officers and a prominent journalist, and vowed to turn Greece into a war zone.

The anarchist movements are fuelled by popular anger over harsh austerity measures passed by the Papandreou government in return for an EU-IMF bailout earlier this year.

Both men refused to recognise the court when they were charged with committing acts of terrorism, belonging to a criminal organisation, possession and use of bombs and explosives, as well as lesser offences including refusing to give their identities and fingerprints.

Analysis

Although it is arguable whether these IEDs were part of a serious terrorist attack aimed at killing or seriously injuring their intended recipients or just a way of gaining publicity ahead of upcoming Greek local elections, it is clear that they provide more proof that the mail and cargo industry is extremely vulnerable to the threat of terrorism.

The explosive devices used in these attacks were not expertly concealed and should not have been difficult to identify, especially by an experienced x-ray screener. The bomb maker used books to conceal the IEDs which under x-ray are simple and clear and therefore do not provide the necessary complex or dense shield that can provide effective concealment. It is therefore worrying that two of these types of devices were able to make it through security checks, onto aircraft and all the way to the German Chancellery’s office and Bologna Airport.

Know the Threat with Infogence

Although they proved unsuccessful, these attacks, together with the recent discovery of IEDs concealed within printer toner cartridges on Cargo planes, provide another reminder that terrorists are extremely imaginative when it comes to the concealment of explosive devices.

Infogence offers a range of tailor made monthly terrorism intelligence reports each providing valid, up to date and relevant information, analysis and videos on terrorist activities throughout the world. They provide the type of information that is invaluable to screeners; opening their eyes to the possibilities of the different types of threats, concealments and methods of delivery that terrorists have used and are currently experimenting with.

For example, in December 2009, Infogence’s Insight Report uncovered a similar concealment of IEDs in hollowed out books by terrorists in Baghdad. In this instance, terrorists used a poetry book to conceal an IED containing 400-550g of plastic explosive wrapped in nylon.  The explosive device used a wireless initiation system, consisting of a Nokia mobile phone, with a safety amplifying system connected to the earphone socket while the charge’s voltage source came from a 9V battery. Pellets were also glued on pieces of cardboard. Fortunately attempts made to detonate the charge failed due to a malfunction in the initiation system.

Actionable Intelligence

The intelligence gained from an Insight report can be tailor made to meet the needs of any organisation. They contain a variety of information that can be used immediately to update and improve security structures, update training plans and increase awareness. These include:

• trends in terrorist explosive manufacturing including chemical explosives, incendiary devices, powder explosives, liquid explosives, plastic explosives, improvised explosive devices, etc…
• trends in concealed explosive devices and concealed weapons
• detailed analysis of recent terrorist attacks throughout the world including bombings, assassinations, hijackings, recent failed terror plots
• terrorist training manuals

For more information on Infogence Systems’ range of actionable terrorism reports and to get a free trial, contact Renful on 0208 457 9111 or email us at info@renful.co.uk

The Incident

On Friday, 29th of October, 2010, two bombs were intercepted by security officials in the UK and Dubai following a tip-off by Saudi authorities. The two devices were posted in the Yemeni capital Sanaa with freight firms UPS and FedEx and were both addressed to Synagogues in Chicago, USA.

It has been confirmed that the device transported by FedEx and intercepted in Dubai had been transported on two passenger jets, first from Yemen to Doha and then on to Dubai on a second plane. The device transported by UPS and seized in the UK also went via Dubai and passed through Cologne in Germany, before being intercepted at East Midlands Airport in the UK.

According to UK Home Secretary Theresa May, “the devices were probably intended to detonate mid air”. The fact that the packages were addressed to historical figures Diego Deza, the 15th century archbishop of Seville, who sadistically interrogated Muslims during the Spanish inquisition, and Reynold Krak, a French knight of the second crusade, who slaughtered Muslim pilgrims, seems to indicate that the packages were not intended to reach their destinations.

Although both devices were discovered on Cargo planes, it is likely that the terrorists aim was to blow up a passenger aircraft. In September, an informant told Saudi intelligence that three dummy devices were to be sent as a “dry run” to see if live bombs could get through. These packages, sent from Yemen and addressed to bookshops in Chicago, were checked, found to contain books and religious pamphlets and allowed to continue to their destination. Terrorists were able to track these packages hour by hour giving them some understanding of the time, method and route of delivery.

It is believed that the same informant provided details of the two real packages to Saudi authorities. One of the consignment numbers was immediately tracked to UPS who traced the parcel to a flight that had already left Cologne, Germany for East Midlands Airport in the UK. Soon after the airport was sealed off and the package was located.

A bomb disposal officer attached to the army unit examined it for explosives, x-raying it and swabbing it with chemicals but could not find any trace of explosives. The news was relayed back to the CIA and Dubai, who told them to look again. This time they were able to find it although it wasn’t until the device had been sent to the Defence Science Laboratory that they were able to establish that it was a viable bomb. Initial inspection of the device in Dubai also fooled a United Arab Emirates’ bomb disposal officer. An insider said “These were probably the most sophisticated devices we’ve come across. The fact that they defeated the expertise of two highly experienced bomb disposal officers is extremely worrying”.

The Devices

Both packages contained devices consisting of Pentaerythritol tetra nitrate (PETN), a colourless and odourless plastic explosive, carefully layered onto the inside walls of printer toner cartridges that were themselves inside laser jet printers.  Both IEDs contained circuit boards from mobile phones, with their SIM cards removed and their alarms acting as timers. The phone’s alarm would send an electric current through a thin wire filament, similar to those found in light bulbs. The wire filament was in a plastic medical syringe that contained 5 grams (0.18 oz) of lead azide, a powerful chemical initiator. Once hot, the lead azide would ignite causing the PETN to detonate.

According to Dubai authorities one of the packages also contained a textbook on management, a copy of The Mill on the Floss by George Eliot and various handicrafts, including a pink and purple lidded basket. German Scientists, who have analysed the two devices, said that they contained at least 300g of powerful PETN explosive enough to punch a hole in an aircraft.

The Suspects

Both Mrs. May and the Dubai authorities said the devices bore all the hallmarks of al-Qaeda and its Middle Eastern offshoot al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – an apparent reference to the group’s previous use of PETN in other attempted attacks.

It is thought that the American born terrorist, Anwar al-Awlaki, is behind this bomb plot and that the devices were made by Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri, a wanted Saudi militant who is also accused of making the bombs used in a string of high-profile operations by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) since mid-2009.

The 28-year-old is believed to have built the device his younger brother used in an assassination attempt on Saudi Arabia’s deputy interior minister in August 2009, and the underwear bomb used by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who was arrested in December 2009, suspected of attempting to blow up an airliner flying from Amsterdam to Detroit.

The Impact on Cargo Screening

The discovery of these two explosive devices is likely to have a serious impact on the way that Cargo is screened throughout the world. Short term measures have already been implemented in the UK and US where all cargo shipments originating from Yemen and Somalia have been banned from their airspace and Printer Toner Cartridges over 500g have been put on the list of restricted items.

In the long term, it is likely that many countries around the world will implement the requirements that the US introduced in August, 2010 for 100% of cargo loaded onto passenger planes to be screened for explosives. They may even go one step further and stipulate a requirement for all cargo shipments to be screened, whether shipped on passenger or cargo aircraft. This would involve all shipments being broken down and each piece screened using physical search, x-ray screening, explosive trace detection, and decompression chambers. As a result cargo companies would most likely experience severe delays, cargo backlogs and transit time increases.

The Solution

These new security measures are only procedural and do not address the actual detection of threats within Cargo shipments. Banning printer toner cartridges and cargo shipments from Yemen, for example, does not stop a terrorist from concealing an IED in a hairdryer or stereo and sending it from the UK. After all Yemen is not the only country where there is terrorist activity.

The successful detection of threats is also not determined by the amount of screening that is carried out. While increasing the number of shipments screened can help, it becomes a rather fruitless task if the screener is not given the training required to detect a threat within them. An untrained screener will find no threats whether he screens 50% or 100% of cargo shipments.

The first step should be to ban all cargo shipments on passenger aircraft while new security procedures and training are implemented. It is unfair to expect passengers to board a plane with freight that has not been screened to the same levels as they have.

The next step is to increase the quality of x-ray and hand search training provided to screeners.

The trend for terrorists to conceal IEDs within other seemingly non threatening objects makes the screener’s job of detecting them even harder. Therefore they must be given the type of training that allows them to know not only what an IED looks like but also how and in what it can be concealed.

This is why Renful Premier Technologies have created a set of security training products specialised to the Cargo industry.

X-ray Simulator Training

Simfox Net, the x-ray threat image processor and training/testing x-ray simulator, has been developed with a number of features aimed at improving the detection skills of Cargo x-ray screeners.

Containing over 1500 images of containers and items, of which 500 are threats, Simfox Net allows trainers to create their own cargo container images and place them onto the simulator for their screeners to be trained and tested. Simfox Net also comes with a built in IED maker, which allows trainers to build and conceal their own IEDs from 100s of explosive materials, detonators and initiators and ensures that screeners are provided with a constant stream of both new and challenging training and testing material.

Given the difficulty of screening large, dense and often complex cargo containers, Renful have ensured that Simfox Net has the same image resolution and image enhancement functions as the x-ray machine the screener is using on a day to day basis. A manifest can also be created for each container ensuring a seamless progression from the classroom to the real thing.

As screeners need to understand how IEDs are concealed, Simfox Net also allows screeners to review each container that they have been tested on. They are able to isolate each item within the container ensuring they get valuable experience of how IEDs are and can be concealed.

Simfox Net also includes an in depth statistical module which allows trainers to review screener performance and adapt the type of training that is provided. This allows trainers to map out the performance of their screeners and ensures that the correct level of training is being provided to each.

Hand Search Training

Much of the visual explosives detection training provided to screeners at the moment is carried out sporadically using pictures. This is ineffectual and only provides limited visual training that does not hold the attention of security personnel.

While using real explosives would be ideal, obtaining and transporting them is extremely difficult, dangerous and inadvisable and therefore cannot be used to provide a regular and effective training plan.

This means that cargo screeners are often forced to rely on limited knowledge and experience to detect items that could cause widespread devastation.

Renful Premier Technologies offer a range of inert replicas or simulants of explosives, IED components and IEDs that simulate the real thing safely and to an unparalleled degree.

These are available in specially created training kits that concentrate on different types of explosives and contain detailed education material that can be used during training.

Individual explosive and IED components that maintain the correct texture, colour, geometrical pattern, density and CT number of real explosives are also available and can be used for the self preparation of IEDs for security drills and the calibration of x-ray machines.

Actionable Intelligence

Terrorism is a continually evolving threat which in order to prevent its devastating consequences requires training that itself is flexible and can be quickly updated.

Infogence Intelligence Reports provide actionable terrorism intelligence by infiltrating closed online terrorist forums and message boards, gathering the relevant information and presenting it as a monthly report featuring analysis, discussions and videos.

They provide the type of information that is invaluable to screeners; opening their eyes to the possibilities of the different types of threats, concealments and methods of delivery that terrorists have used and are currently experimenting with.

In addition to the reports, Renful also develop inert replicas of the IEDs discussed in the report and now have an extensive library of these drill items from which to choose from. These inert IEDs can be used as part of security drills as well as hand search training.

For more information on any of our products or to arrange a presentation contact Renful on +44 (0) 20 8457 9111 or email us at info@renful.co.uk

The Human Factor

Ever since the attack on Pan –Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988, X-ray machines have become a main stay of security checkpoints throughout the world. Although they may look very sophisticated, they are essentially just imaging systems, and cannot be relied on to automatically identify weapons and explosives effectively.

Security X-ray machines therefore  rely heavily on their operators correctly analysing each image that comes through, a task which is made all the more difficult by the fact that they have, in a busy environment like an airport, only a few seconds to carry out their search.

If we compare the tasks required from an x-ray screener in finding a threat to that of a radiologist finding a disease we can clearly understand the difficulties of the job.  For example, a hospital radiologist will examine each medical x-ray image for several minutes and often consult with colleagues before making a diagnosis. Also, a medical x-ray image is viewed in a quiet and darkened room, with no distractions.

On the other hand security x-ray personnel have only about 6 seconds to inspect each bag image.  Within this very short time period the x-ray screener must intensively scan for prohibited articles and make a decision about each luggage item.  X-ray images in airports are also viewed in bright light with noise and a multitude of other potential distractions. The sheer number of bags that have to be screened and the cluttered patterns on each bag image makes it very challenging to identify dangerous items, especially as many objects look different under x-ray to how they appear in reality.

Now imagine you switch those working environments around; the radiologist would make mistakes, patients would be angry and changes would be made to the procedures immediately.

So why is it we accept the difficulties faced by x-ray screeners? After all, they are both searching for a potentially deadly threat, one to an airport and its passengers, the other to an individual’s well being.

The fact is that every bag cannot be checked thoroughly for much longer than 6 seconds in busy environments. Stopping each and every bag on the conveyor belt for longer would drive check in times earlier and earlier and create longer queues which in themselves would provide an attractive target to a terrorist.

The solution therefore is to train security x-ray screeners to a level that befits the critical job that they carry out.  Just as hospitals invest in the education of radiologists, security organisations need to invest in the training of security x-ray personnel. Perhaps not to the same level as radiologists, who after all require a university education, but at least using the best possible tools at our disposal within an effective and well thought out training schedule.

Simfox – Advanced Security X-Ray CBT

Security X-ray is an extremely specialised subject and requires advanced software that can deliver training that covers all the capabilities required to become an effective screener. For this reason Renful Premier Technologies developed, in 1989, the first ever security x-ray CBT; Simfox. Over the years Simfox has been continually developed, becoming the standard bearer for all other security x-ray CBTs on the market.

Simfox delivers the most accurate computer simulation of an x-ray machine allowing security trainees to use the same image enhancements, zoom functions and control features of the original machine. In fact, Renful’s newest development, Simfox Net, offers an on screen replica of the dashboard of the x-ray machine, so screeners can get themselves quickly acquainted to the x-ray machine’s various functions.

Simfox is currently compatible with all major manufacturers of x-ray machine and, unlike many other security x-ray CBT, offers simulators unique to each. This lack of discrepancies between simulation and reality allows for a seamless move from classroom to on the job training.

Simfox is extremely easy to implement into security training procedures and can be used in all types of applications including Airports, Cargo, Mail, Parliament Buildings, Prisons, Secure Hospitals and other high security establishments. It can be delivered through a number of flexible license options and is available through LAN, WAN and internet connections enabling organisations to provide training both within classrooms and remotely.

Security X-ray training

As most newly appointed x-ray screeners will come to the job having never seen the images that a security x-ray machine produces, Simfox offers a range of readymade, fully editable, x-ray image interpretation courses. These courses consist of items being put through the simulator at different angles enabling trainees to get a better idea of their shape, colour and density under x-ray. The courses include all types of threat items as well as innocent items, especially those that can be easily used to conceal weapons and explosive devices.

Once the x ray image interpretation courses have been completed, the next step is to introduce these items into a bag or container. Unlike many other xray CBTS, Simfox, as well as offering pre-packed bags, allows trainers to build their own bags from scratch using the thousands of individual items within the database. This feature is immensely useful as it allows security x-ray trainers to create an almost infinite number of bags that provide the kind of customised training that is so essential to their students.

The easy customisation of bags means trainers can adapt the training they give to the level of competency of their trainee. At first they may place the threat items within bags so that they are easily identifiable. As training evolves, the trainer can up the difficulty by concealing the threat behind other objects within the bag. In essence, the trainer becomes the terrorist creating the type of intelligent training content that is needed to combat the threat of modern terrorism.

Statistical Reporting

In order to map the progress of each student, Simfox has an integrated statistical module that records each and every student’s test results. As well as providing a useful tool for developing reports for management, it offers a range of valuable training functions. For example, Simfox provides an analysis of each student’s detection rate for each category of threat. Training can then be adapted to suit the needs of the student; increasing the level of training on a certain threat. All in all it allows the trainers to identify weaknesses in their screeners and provide the type of relevant and continuous training that is required.

Summary

The task given to x-ray screeners is extremely difficult. In order to give them the best possible chance to detect threats, they must be given the best possible training available. This can be achieved through the use of high-tech x-ray threat detection CBTs like Simfox that provides a multilevel approach to training enabling x-ray screeners the opportunity to develop the capabilities required to become effective at their job.

Renful will be holding a seminar on X-ray training and testing in London and Singapore this year. Click here for more information.

Alternatively, click here if you wish to find out more about Simfox, or contact us on 0208 457 9111 or at info@renful.co.uk.

This article’s aim is to identify the types of security screening technology passengers are likely to encounter in the near future and determine how effective they can be in stopping future terrorist attacks.

Body Scanner Technology

The proposed introduction of Full Body scanners into Airport security installations has garnered by far the most publicity with human rights activists decrying the dangers these scanners pose on both the health and privacy of individuals.

Millimeter Wave

Millimeter wave scanners cost around $100,000 and are therefore cheaper then backscatter x-ray and transmission x-ray technology. Body-Scanners using Millimeter waves provide the least health concerns as they use naturally occurring radiation in the earth’s atmosphere and do not subject others to additional ionising radiation exposure. They are also quick and therefore would have negligible effect on passenger throughput if implemented. The images produced by Millimeter wave machines are also far less graphic then for other types of scanning technology and therefore offer far more privacy to those being screened.

Full -Body Scanners like the L3 ProVision also offer the option to blur certain parts of the body; however this would completely defeat the purpose of their introduction. To completely negate any privacy concerns, L3 have also developed the ProVision AT which converts the scanned image into a generic stick figure and then affixes any concealed items onto it.

Millimetre wave technology can also be used in standoff scanners, as demonstrated by Brijot Imaging Systems’ GEN2. One of these millimetre scanners can scan 360 people per hour and detects concealed items on people from a distance without them having to stop.

While millimetre technology is quicker, cheaper and offers less privacy issues then other technologies, the quality of image leaves a lot to be desired. After all new technology must have the capabilities to detect new and existing threats and there are serious doubts as to whether millimetre wave scanners could have identified the IED concealed in Abdulmutallab’s underpants.

Backscatter X-Ray

Backscatter X-ray technology costs around $150,000 and uses  low doses of x-ray radiation to scan the body. Machines like the Rapiscan Secure 1000 and AS&E’s SmartCheck rotates the individual slowly subjecting them to ultra low doses of x-ray radiation and delivers a better quality of image then Millimeter wave Technology.

The better image quality does however make for slow throughput and more worries over privacy. To combat this AS&E have developed the SmartCheck HT which can provide front and back scans of the individual without any rotation involved. They have also developed a privacy setting which only shows the outline image of the individual and any concealed items within it. As with Millimeter Technology, these machines are not able to store any x-ray images.

In terms of Health issues, AS&E use Z Backscatter which they claim  only subjects individuals to the same amount of radiation as they would get from flying in aircraft for 2 minutes at 30,000 feet (9,200metres). That is the equivalent of 0.1 millisieverts, which considering the International Commission on Radiological Protection recommends that radiation should not exceed 1 millisievert a year is a small price to pay for better security.

Backscatter technology does offer advantages to other technologies in that it provides a relatively good quality image, however using them on every passenger would severely lengthen queues, something that could prove attractive to a suicide bomber.

Transmission X-Ray

Transmission X-ray technology would be seen as controversial, but is worth considering in some rare circumstances. It is similar to a medical x-ray and offers through body scanning allowing for the detection of items concealed internally.

As security measures only detect items beneath clothes, the next logical step for terrorists would be to conceal their IEDs internally just as traffickers currently do with drugs. In fact, the attempted assassination on a Saudi Prince in 2009 is thought to have been carried out using an anally concealed IED.

ODSecurity’s SOTER RS and Adani’s Conpass systems are used by Customs in many countries around the world for clearing purposes as it provides them with the technology to identify internal carries but its use in airports is still very limited.

So while this technology would be seen as controversial, it is important to note that the only other way of detecting internally concealed items currently is quite unpleasant. The fact is Transmission X-ray should only be used on someone who is seen as high risk following profiling and other security checks.

Explosive Trace Detection Portals

Explosive Trace Detection Portals were for a long time seen as the next major implementation into security checkpoints but have been recently usurped by the full body scanners. This technology uses air showers to collect minute particles from clothing and the human body and analyses them against their database of explosives.

The advantage of these portals is that they do not invade personal privacy, and are completely automated therefore negating screener error. However their ability to only detect explosives present in their database makes them vulnerable if terrorists develop the capability to manufacture new types of explosives.

Terahertz Light

The company TeraView have developed automated body scanners that use terahertz light to detect explosives on individuals. Terahertz light lies between radio and light waves on the electromagnetic spectrum and does not produce any ionising radiation. As explosive material absorbs this type of light strongly at certain frequencies it means machines using this technology should be able to distinguish between explosives and other materials.

Luggage Screening Technology

Apart from a few image enhancements buttons and slightly better resolution, X-Ray has not really evolved much in the last 20 years when compared to other types of technology.

Multi View and 3D X-Ray Machines

Multi view X-ray machines use existing x-ray technology but offer multiple (2-5) of luggage to screeners providing them with a complete perspective regardless of their orientation inside the system.

The screener will be asked to concentrate on one screen at a time and if required will look at the others eliminating the need for rescreening bags at different angles. Machines that use this technology like the Rapiscan 620DV and Smiths Detection HI-SCAN 6040aTIX also include automated detection software designed to identify the presence and position of a threat based upon context, material density, size and effective atomic number.

3D X-Ray machines have imaging software that offers both 2D and 3D views of bags that can be rotated. This should theoretically help the screener identify items in the bag and make threat concealment behind other items harder for terrorists. However given the short amount of time available to screeners to view each bag (6seconds) it is unclear as to whether they will have the time to use this new gadget effectively.

Evaluation

All these technologies have their pros and cons and none should be seen as the definitive answer to securing airports and other high security establishments from terrorist attacks. Time constraints and budget restrictions make it impossible to use all of these technologies on every passenger. Security personnel must therefore be trained to distinguish between high and low risk passengers enabling them to use the required level of screening on each individual (see profiling article).

The automation of threat detection, while helpful in many ways, can lead to the job of security screener being devalued. We should not take it for granted that automated systems will detect each and every threat presented to them. We should be training staff regularly and providing them with the skills, knowledge and understanding that will enable them to detect threats.

Technological advances in security screening are to be encouraged but we should always remember that the human factor is just as important.

Whenever a terrorist manages to breach the security system designed to protect airports, questions are asked as to why these countermeasures failed. Invariably new regulations are created and money is spent on technologies in the hope that they fill the gaps left by the last security breach. For example, following the Liquid bomb plot, restrictions were put into place limiting passengers to 100ml bottles of liquid in their hand luggage and more recently money has been spent on full body scanners in the hope that they will detect IEDs concealed on terrorists’ bodies.

Continually mutating threat

Although adding new technologies and restricting certain items can help security screeners detect threat items, they are not effective against the continually mutating threat of terrorism.  Infogence, providers of terrorism incidents and activities intelligence reports, are continually gathering intelligence regarding discussions about new IED technologies and concealments on terrorist websites and message boards.

So while the new regulations and body scanners may foil another “Underwear Bomb” style terrorist attack, they may not be effective against whatever the terrorists use next.

Inefficient security measures

Current security measures are extremely predictable usually involving an X-ray machine and a metal detector/ body scanner while slower but more advanced explosives detection technologies are rarely used.

The security measures therefore rely heavily on the ability of x-ray screeners to identify concealed IEDs, weapons and their components that, without the highest level of training, are extremely difficult to detect. Added to this the fact that security companies are under pressure to get passengers through security checks and into duty free shops as quickly as possible means that screeners are not being given the required time to provide an informed decision on each bag.

Screening all passengers and their luggage in exactly the same way, using the same technologies and as quickly as possible seems extremely inefficient given the fact that 99.9% of passengers are not terrorists.  If the current security measures were applied to a doctor’s surgery, the doctor would take an x-ray of each patient, no matter what their complaint was, look at it for 6 seconds and provide a diagnosis.

Fortunately, doctors do not treat patients this way, and instead ask a few questions before deciding whether further tests are needed on the patient or whether they can be diagnosed straight away. The same principle could be applied to security screening through the use of passenger profiling.

Passenger Profiling

Profiling involves carrying out a risk analysis on all passengers passing through a security checkpoint. It involves passengers being asked a set of questions based on any suspicious signs in their documentation, itinerary, appearance and behaviour. The screener then decides based on the passenger’s behaviour and answers whether they are a threat to the flight they are attempting to board.

Those who pose a threat are put through stringent security measures using complimentary detection technologies like explosives trace detectors, while those who are not seen as threats would ideally go through the normal security measures minus the removal of shoes, liquids and so on.

Profiling therefore provides a more efficient use of both security personnel and technologies.  Security staff can be trained on previous attacks and known terrorist modus operandi enabling them to respond to future threats as well as to those of the past while screeners are given the required time and technologies needed to detect the threat items concealed by terrorists.

An Integrated Security Process

Passenger Profiling should not be seen as a substitute for other screening processes but be integrated into a one stop security checkpoint involving the screening of checked luggage, hand luggage and passengers.

Integrating all security processes allows for security personnel to get the full picture when screening passengers and their luggage. They can identify anomalies and create a more detailed profile of each passenger.

An example of where an integrated security process involving profiling could have been used successfully comes following the recent attempt to blow up flight 253. Abdulmutallab could have been asked why he bought his ticket in Ghana with cash for a flight that left from Nigeria  or why he had not checked luggage for a 2 week stay in the U.S. Had he not provided adequate answers to these questions then he could have been selected for a more thorough check using the various detection tools available.

The need for Training

Although passenger profiling has been implemented in many airports around the world it is often scaled back due to fears that it encourages racial discrimination. There is a worry that screeners can become complacent, see someone and decide that they are a threat due to their religious belief or the colour of their skin rather than through proper reasoning.

The fact is that profiling must be carried out by skilled individuals who have been properly trained to identify terrorists through behavioural analysis, documentation and expert questioning.

Renful Premier Technologies offer a seminar designed to equip all participants with the knowledge, techniques and practical skills required to organise and implement an effective Profiling System at their location.

For more information on our Passenger Profiling please visit us at http://www.renful.co.uk

X-ray screeners and other key security staff are required to detect items such as explosives, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), weapons, drugs and other threat items. However, many security screeners will have little or no experience or exposure to these types of items due to their lack of availability.

Security screeners may be able to identify guns and perhaps grenades as they have little variation in their geometrical shapes and are easily recognisable. However, explosives, explosive devices, their components and drugs are a lot harder to detect given that they are generally moulded into different shapes in order for them to be concealed in other items thus never maintaining a fixed geometrical pattern.

For explosive screening to be successful operators must understand the concealment potential of items and have the interpretation skills to identify them both with and without concealed explosives. Unfortunately a survey carried out in Airports using the Simfox x-ray training simulator has found that detection of concealed IED, without the adequate training, can drop as low as 12%.

Current Explosives Detection Training

Much of the explosives familiarisation & detection training around the world is carried out sporadically using pictures and real explosives. Showing pictures of explosives is ineffectual as it only provides limited visual training and does not hold the attention of security personnel.

Using real explosives would be ideal, however obtaining and transporting them is extremely difficult, dangerous and inadvisable and therefore cannot be used to provide a regular and effective training plan.

This means that security check point personnel are often forced to rely on limited knowledge and experience to detect items that could cause widespread devastation.

Renful’s Explosives Detection Training Product Suite

Renful has therefore developed an integrated product suite designed to provide security trainers with the tools needed to develop an explosive detection training plan that covers the key factors needed to increase screener x-ray interpretation and detection skills; familiarisation of threat functionality, geometrical patterns and concealment potential.

These are:

1. Educational Kits
2. Inert Explosives & Components
3. Drill Library
4. Drill Library +

a) Educational Kits

Renful Premier Technologies has developed a range of educational kits that are designed to teach security operatives about the texture, weight and geometrical pattern of different threat items and their components.

Each training kit has been developed to provide familiarisation training on different aspects of explosives, explosive devices, their components and drugs. Each kit contains detailed educational material and his held in a hard briefcase for safe keeping and ease of transport.

b) Inert Explosives and Components

Renful has developed a range of state of the art simulant explosives, explosive device components and drugs for the use in threat detection training and testing, machine testing and the self preparation of concealed IEDs.

As these simulants maintain the correct texture, colour and geometrical pattern of real explosives they are ideal for use in visual familiarisation and hand search training.

As Renful’s inert explosives are made from CT correct materials they retain the correct x-ray signature and can therefore be used by many organisations around the world for the calibration & testing of explosive detection technology like trace detectors and x-ray machines.

These inert explosives and components also allow for the self preparation of drill items by security trainers to control the complexity of the testing object given to their employees.

c) Drill Library

Renful professionals build a simulated IED or other threat item all made from CT correct densities and conceal them in innocent objects. This makes these drill items ideal for both visual familiarisation training, hand search training and x-ray threat detection training and testing.

d) Drill Library +

While all drill items created by Renful are built following consultation from weapon and explosives experts, they cannot be validated. Validation refers to the likelihood that such an item will be used by a terrorist organisation.

Drill Library + offers concealed weapons and IEDs that have been validated by intelligence gathered by Infogence Terrorism Reports.

Infogence Systems (a Renful Company) infiltrates extremist websites and gathers intelligence on terrorist bomb manufacturing activities. Renful’s explosives experts are then able to create drill items based on the recipes and instructions gathered.

For more information or to obtain our free Explosives Training Product Catalogue contact Renful at info@renful.co.uk or via our website